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Abstract 
Many engineering methods have been developed to help management select technology for a system design or 
further research. The simplest way to compare technologies is to use a checklist containing all the more or less 
important selection criteria, so that nothing is overlooked. The criteria usually include cost, safety, reliability and 
maintainability, and potential problems such as noise generation and microgravity sensitivity. The next step typically 
is to weight and score all the criteria. The process of weighting and scoring is helpful in bringing out different 
priorities and reaching a shared point of view. Group technology selection methods are designed to highlight initial 
disagreements and produce a shared consensus. Often a frank discussion led by management rather than decision 
analysts can be more effective. The final selection depends on management and engineering judgment and may 
include programmatic and organizational factors that are beyond the engineering checklist. The objective of 
engineering technology selection methods is to provide engineering information to assist management in making 
sound decisions.  
Project management and technology selection are assumed to use rational engineering analytic methods, but they 
often do not. The reason is that human insight, intuition, and “gut feel,” rather than logic, more frequently determine 
our decisions. Project selection and management are strongly influenced by nonrational psychological influences, 
which can produce unjustified confidence and determination.  
Nevertheless, there is a strong need for space projects to do rational project analysis and selection. Demonstrating 
a rational spirit is necessary for a scientific and technical organization. Professional ethics at its best requires an 
open, honest, and fair process, without damaging politics. Rational analysis can help improve good projects and 
avoid selecting bad ones. A sanity check using rational analysis guided by a checklist can help avoid egregious and 
damaging errors. 
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Acronyms 
ESM = Equivalent System Mass  
LCC = Life Cycle Cost 
NPD  = New Product Development 
NPV = Net Present Value 
Pr(LOC) = Probability of Loss of Crew 
R&D  = Research and Development 
TRL = Technology Readiness Level 
WYSIATI = What You See Is All There Is 
 
1. Introduction 
Space projects are usually supported and approved 
based on management judgment and the organizational 
budget process. The project selection process should 
also include an engineering technology selection 
method, such as using a checklist of criteria. This can 
help prevent the approval of seriously flawed project.  
 
2. Engineering methods to select technology 
This section describes technology selection using 
checklists and mentions some other analytic and 
quantitative methods. A radar chart can be used to 
display the criteria on the checklist.  
 
2.1 Checklists 
Checklists are a simple way to identify the 
relevant factors in making a technology selection 
decision. Neglecting an important systems engineering 
consideration such as risk can be very harmful.  
 
2.2 Space project selection criteria 
A new space technology should not be selected for 
flight unless it meets the well-known criteria of safety, 
availability, performance, and cost. Safety appears to be 
most important in selection, availability next, then 
performance, and cost appears least important. But any 
single criterion can be the deciding factor. A candidate 
technology can be rejected because of deficiencies in 
safety, availability, performance, or cost. And other 
things being equal, a technology can be adopted because 
of clear superiority in only one of the selection factors.  
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Safety is the most important technology selection 
determinant. The safety requirement for manned space 
systems has traditionally been that there are no single 
point failures that could result in injury, loss of life, or 
loss of mission. This has led to the use of redundancy, 
such as the common requirement for two fault tolerance. 
A better measure of safety is the probability of loss of 
crew, Pr(LOC), since in some cases adding redundancy 
can actually increase the probability of loss of crew. 
Normally a candidate flight system will be designed to 
meet the required probability of loss of crew, and this 
will impact cost and performance. Hazards should be 
identified, including high temperature, high pressure, 
high voltage, high power, and dangerous materials.  
The availability of hardware for space flight is 
usually measured by its Technology Readiness Level 
(TRL). TRL appears to be a governing factor in space 
system hardware selection, for several reasons. A 
technology with a TRL of less than 5, meaning 
validated in a relevant environment, is not usually 
considered in flight system selection. The TRLs of 
candidate technologies increase when more R&D is 
funded. Since continued investments would be directed 
toward technologies promising better safety, 
performance, or cost, a high TRL suggests that these 
other criteria will also be high. Higher TRL usually 
implies that the remaining development cost will be 
lower.  
A candidate flight system will be designed to meet 
all the functional performance specifications, including 
operations, interfaces, and quality. Some other aspects 
of performance are microgravity sensitivity, 
contamination potential, noise level, flexibility in use, 
and commonality of application. The “-ilities,” 
operability, maintainability, and reliability, impact the 
required crew time and the operations costs. Complexity 
is difficult to quantify but seems related to more 
difficult maintenance and repair and more time 
consuming operations. System complexity is recognized 
as a cost driver in some cost estimation methods.  
Life Cycle Cost (LCC) is a basic metric in systems 
analysis and project selection. LCC combines all the 
costs of a mission in one number. These costs include 
system development and test, supporting equipment, 
space launch, resupply, operations, maintenance, and 
even decommissioning. Higher LCC may be justified to 
obtain better safety and performance. If other criteria 
are nearly equal, mission designers would tend to select 
the system with the lowest LCC.   
Future costs should be discounted to their net 
present value (NPV). Since money earns interest, a 
dollar now is worth more than a dollar later. Economic 
theory also states that past costs are not relevant to 
current system selection. Past investments are sunk 
costs and cannot be recovered. The current situation, not 
past actions, should determine current technology 
choices.   
 
2.3 Radar chart display of the criteria scores 
The radar chart can be used to display the multiple 
criteria used in a technology selection process. The 
radar chart can easily display two or three different 
systems described by five or more criteria. Compound 
criteria such as performance and cost can be split into 
factors that are displayed in lower level radar charts.  
The numerical estimates for probability of loss of 
crew, TRL, and LCC, and the qualitative scores for 
performance and the ‘ilities must be converted to 
criteria scores for display in a radar chart. Higher 
positive scores indicate better performance and the 
highest possible scores should be equal if we want to 
give equal weighting to the criteria. A smaller Pr(LOC) 
is better, so higher numbers get lower scores. Safety 
score = 100*lowest Pr(LOC)/scored system Pr(LOC). 
Higher TRL is better and the maximum TRL of 9 of 
should correspond to a score of 100. Better performance 
and ‘ilities get higher scores, with best performance 
getting the maximum of 100. Since lower LCC is better, 
like lower Pr(LOC) is better, a similar inverse metric is 
needed. LCC score = 100*lowest LCC/scored system 
LCC.  
Table 1 gives example criteria scores for two 
Projects, 1 and 2.  
 
Table 1. Criteria scores for Project 1 and Project 2.  
categories Project 1 Project 2 
Project 1 - 
Project 2 
Safety 100 60 40 
TRL 40 50 -10 
Performance 60 80 -20 
'ilities 80 55 25 
LCC 85 100 -15 
Sum of 
scores 365 345 20 
 
Figure 1 shows the radar chart plot of the scores in 
Table 1. If the data category number scales accurately 
reflect the relative values of the categories, the best 
system choice is the one with the greatest sum of the 
category data values. Project 1 has a sum of 365, Project 
2 of 345, a difference of 20. It is probably better to 
select a project based on an overall impression and the 
decision maker’s valuation of the criteria than on the 
specific scores. Selecting Project 1 would provide 
strong advantages in safety and the ‘ilities,, but accept 
lower TRL, lower performance, and higher LCC.  
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Figure 1. Radar chart comparing Projects 1 and 2.  
 
2.4 Project selection errors 
Common project selection analysis errors include:  
1. Missing criteria 
2. Dependent or correlated criteria  
3. Ignored good alternative project choices 
4. Different criteria used for different projects 
5. Wrong decision maker or stakeholders 
6. Predetermined or biased decisions 
7. Undocumented rationales for criteria, weighting, 
scoring, and selection 
 
2.5 Other analytic and quantitative methods 
A survey of 200 US technology R&D organizations 
concluded that those R&D organizations were satisfied 
with their project selection approach, if it used an open 
formal process, that included several techniques, that 
was applied to all projects at the same time, and was 
supported by management. The more popular methods 
were Net Present Value (NPV) (used by 77%), resource 
allocation by strategic goals (65%), scoring (38%), 
checklists (21%), and scatter diagrams (41%). All the 
organizations used more than one project selection 
method and the probabilities add to 242%, so 2.4 was 
the average number of methods used. NPV depends on 
future financial projections and was considered less 
helpful. [1] Strategic goals are important but lie outside 
of the project itself. Checklists and scoring seem direct 
and useful. The radar chart can show many more than 
the two dimensions shown in a scatter chart.  
 
 
 
2.5 Non quantitative project success factors 
Different success prediction factors are 
important in the two basic different types of 
projects, R&D and New Product Development 
(NPD). For R&D, high level management support, 
the probability of technical success, an existing 
customer, and the need for lower cost are the major 
success factors. For NPD, good planning, strong 
marketing, and a favorable competitive environment 
are more important. However, management support 
and customer commitment often depend on expected 
technical success, so a high probability of success is 
usually needed for project approval. [2]  
 
2.5 Formal group project selection 
Organizations that are satisfied with their project 
selection approach typically use group discussion 
methods with clear rules and procedures that are 
applied to all projects at the same time. Their project 
selection process is strongly supported by 
management. This helps to build consensus and 
develop management insight. It encourages better 
project proposals by clarifying the desired project 
attributes. It gains rank-and-file support by appearing 
fair. [1]  
A good project selection process should do the 
following:  
1. Evaluate all the proposals  
2. Use the same criteria  
3. At the same time  
4. Rank the proposals and have everyone understand 
the ranking 
5. Select a balanced portfolio according to understood 
objectives 
 
3. Formal project selection is not widely used 
Many different technology ranking and project 
selection methods have been proposed, but they have 
had poor acceptance and questionable effectiveness 
when used.  “Although the published literature over the 
past 30 years outlines many approaches for portfolio 
management and project selection, there is very little 
evidence regarding the widespread transfer of these 
techniques into management practice or whether these 
approaches have had positive results.” [1] “Classical 
R&D project selection models have been virtually 
ignored by industry.” [3]  
 
3.1 No proven good methods 
The primary reason for the limited use of formal 
project selection methods is that there are no universally 
accepted, no proven good methods. “Contrary to the 
belief of many people, there are no significant data or 
empirical evidence upon which to base a more rational 
approach to research management. … no reliable data 
exist on the effectiveness of the quantitative 
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methodologies … R&D managers have chosen, 
generally for good reason, to retain personal 
responsibility for project evaluation.” [4] Some 
researchers have concluded that there are no project 
criteria that have been proven useful in selecting better 
projects. “Researchers have been unable to converge on 
any key success factors.” [5]  
 
3.2 Use of more intuitive group methods 
The early hope that project selection could be done 
solely by formal objective mathematical methods has 
been replaced by more acceptance of an inevitable 
subjective group process. Currently technology ranking 
and project selection use simple and intuitive methods, 
such as scoring using a list of criteria, group consensus, 
and consideration of strategic balance. These are user-
friendly and more suitable for existing groups within 
organizations than for single decision makers. [1]  
 
4. Intuition is the key factor in project selection 
It has long been realized that, “Intuition is important 
in most management decisions.” [4] “(L)arge elements 
of judgment, intuition, and experience characterize 
management decisions.” [6] “Many of the decisions in 
R&D are still made based on ad hoc methods of ‘gut 
feeling’.” [7]  
 “Prevailing mythology depicts managers as 
rational … it’s wrong.” When this is pointed out, “they 
always respond with a mix of discomfiture and 
recognition. … they don’t like to be told about 
it. …rationality (is) an afterthought.” [8]  
 
5. Human intuitive heuristics 
In Daniel Kahneman’s book, Thinking, Fast and 
Slow, he explains there are two types of human 
thinking, fast, intuitive, emotional or, in contrast, slow, 
deliberative and logical. [9] Kahneman won the Nobel 
prize in economics for experiments disproving the 
common assumption that humans were rational 
economic optimizers and by explaining the human 
decision errors that are common in intuitive thinking.  
Kahneman labeled the two complementary decision 
making systems as System 1 and System 2. System 1 is 
associative, holistic, subconscious, automatic, easy, and 
fast. It is used for quick response in familiar situations 
and includes many common decision biases and 
heuristics. It is usually considered partly innate or hard 
wired, primitive, and inferior to System 2. System 2 is 
analytic, controlled, conscious, logical, difficult, and 
slow. It is used to consider complex social and technical 
problems and often uses mathematics, logic, and 
science. System 2 is learned through culture and formal 
teaching and is expected to be revised based on reason 
and evidence. [9]  
The heuristics described by Kahneman include 
anchoring, attribute substitution, availability, framing, 
loss aversion, overconfidence, and the sunk cost fallacy, 
all of which can strongly bias decision making.  
Three human heuristics that particularly affect 
project selection are loss aversion, myopia, and inside 
view overconfidence. Loss aversion refers to the fact 
that losses are felt much more strongly than gains of the 
same objective cash value. People will risk gambling 
gains, “house money,” more readily than their own 
funds. Myopia refers to valuing near term gains much 
more than long term gains. People often prefer taking 
$100 now to $120 in a year, implying that their required 
interest rate is more than 20%. Inside view 
overconfidence refers to the fact that people consider 
the chance of success in their own projects, that they 
know from the inside, much higher than the statistical 
average chance of success of unknown projects. These 
heuristics are not economically rational in the modern 
world, but they seem to have been practically useful in 
the evolutionary past.  
 
5.1 Individual heuristics affect project selection 
Organizational project selection seems to be 
impaired by these individual human heuristics. Because 
of loss aversion and myopia, an organization will “turn 
down a series of risky projects, fearing potential losses, 
even though portfolios of such projects appear 
acceptable.” Due to myopia, organizations “choose 
projects one at a time, rather than considering portfolios 
of projects.” Overconfidence based on the inside view 
“may be the main reason that myopic, loss-adverse 
managers take any risks at all.” [10] 
 
5.2 Sunk cost fallacy? 
One common recommendation in economic decision 
making is to ignore sunk costs, which are all the past 
and unrecoverable expenditures. Projects should be 
selected by considering only the future costs and 
benefits. MBA students and others educated in 
economic decision making are compellingly trained to 
“ignore sunk costs.” But this defines them as members 
of “a minor subculture,” since “to one not versed in 
these matters, the phrase is cryptic and the concept is 
not natural.” [11]  
Sunk costs are rarely ignored in the real world. 
Projects are pursued long after they get in trouble and 
the original expectations are obviously unlikely to be 
met. Failing projects are funded and often have their 
funding increased rather than cut because of personal 
investment and public commitment to the project. [12] 
Large overruns, schedule delays, and performance 
shortfalls become routine.  
 
5.3 The group can correct individual errors? 
Somewhat surprisingly, Kahneman, who disproved 
rational economic man, has great hope for the rational 
organization. “Organizations are better than individuals 
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when it comes to avoiding errors, because they naturally 
think more slowly and have the power to impose orderly 
procedures. … an organization is a factory that 
manufactures judgments and decisions. Every factory 
must have ways to ensure the quality of its products 
(i.e., decisions).” [9] Rational organizational behaviour 
remains an idealistic hope to be achieved.  
 
5.4 Overconfidence due to WYSIATI 
The lack of technical analysis in project selection is 
a sign of overconfidence. Kahneman explains 
overconfidence as, “Jumping to conclusions on the basis 
of limited evidence.” To refer to this phenomenon 
throughout his book, he creates the acronym, 
WYSIATI, What You See Is All There Is. Quick 
intuitive thinking “is radically insensitive to both the 
quality and the quantity of information that gives rise to 
impressions and intuitions.” WYSIATI ignores 
information, and limited reality testing is the root cause 
of overconfidence. WYSIATI “facilitates the 
achievement of coherence and of the cognitive ease that 
causes us to accept a statement as true.” [9] Good 
project selection would avoid WYSIATI and attempt to 
gather and weigh all relevant information. Using a 
checklist can draw attention to things we do not see here 
and now.  
 
6. Intuition can lead to good decisions 
It has been usual to prefer and advocate the use of 
rational analysis as in Kahneman’s System 2 for 
management and technical problems, but recently the 
intuition of System 1 has become more appreciated. In 
addition to quick judgments in simple situations, such as 
same or different, gain or loss, friend or foe, intuition 
also includes pattern recognition and reaction to learned 
complex patterns, such as chess positions or social 
situations. People learn to recognize complex situations 
unconsciously and can develop strong emotionally felt 
reactions to them that they cannot readily explain. A 
person who has dealt effectively with similar situations 
for many years will develop a subject area expertise and 
trained judgment that can produce highly effective 
intuitive decisions. Competent respected top managers 
often lead very successfully simply by following their 
gut.  
 
6.1 Support for using insight  
Advances in social psychology and neuroscience 
have helped explain the use of intuition in organization 
management. Decision science researchers have made 
progress in understanding non-conscious ways of 
knowing, including distinguishing between instinct, 
intuition, and insight. Most decisions seem to depend 
more on emerging feelings based on gut feel than on 
explicit conscious reasoning processes.  
Advocates of using intuitive management judgment 
based on deep experience have claimed that intuition “is 
an indispensable component of strategic competence” 
and “is as essential to the competence portfolio of hard-
pressed decision makers as many of the analytical skills 
that feature in contemporary business school curricula.” 
[13]  
Intuition is a judgment about a possible course of 
action that comes to mind with a feeling of rightness, 
but without the ability to provide clear reasons or 
justifications. We know what to do but we can’t explain 
why it’s right or how we discovered it. Intuition should 
be checked against reality, hard facts, and logical 
inference. Correct intuition and sound rational analysis 
should give the same answer. System 1 and System 2 
are best thought of as two parallel systems of knowing. 
When intuition and reason disagree, it is often because 
intuition includes subconscious factors not accessible to 
reason, suggesting that rational analysis needs further 
effort. The strong conviction produced by intuition 
explains why it often dominates and distorts rational 
thinking. [13]  
Intuition or insight is not the same as instinct, and it 
is important to distinguish between them. Instinct is an 
innate, fixed pattern of behaving or emotionally reacting 
to some evolutionary significant stimulus. Humans fear 
snakes, prefer the familiar, and feel in-group loyalty and 
out-group rivalry. Several important hardwired instincts 
affect human decision making, and are usually thought 
to be irrational and damaging.  
Insight or intuition provides a person with a self-
convincing solution to a problem. The solution often 
comes suddenly and unexpectedly after a period of 
uncertainty and worry. Insight seems to require an 
incubation period that enables non-conscious processes 
to operate freely without rational analysis. Scientific 
insights may occur at a “eureka” moment, a flash and 
then “I have found it.” [13]  
Insight can be defined as “an understanding of cause 
and effect based on identification of relationships and 
behaviors within a model, context, or scenario.” [14] 
Insight can occur after a person has acquired extensive 
experience with a particular kind of recurring situation. 
Unfortunately, expertise does not transfer to new and 
unfamiliar situations, so a strong insight can be very 
misleading.  
 
6.2 Problems with using insight  
There are several problems with depending on 
situational insight or intuition. First, intuition has no 
conscious basis and so it cannot easily be explained. 
After the fact justifications can seem weak, ad hoc, 
concocted. Second, intuition is specific to a particular 
field and is often far wrong if applied outside the area 
where it was acquired. Intuitions based on different 
experiences often clash. Third, since a decision maker’s 
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intuitions seem obviously right and are strongly 
emotionally confirmed, it is difficult to use System 2 to 
check them. Fourth, the real world is changing rapidly 
and intuition changes slowly as new experience is 
gained. A rapid real world change can invalidate learned 
expectations based on past history.   
Humans tend to be overconfident, to underestimate 
uncertainty, to be excessively risk adverse, to ignore 
sunk costs due to loss aversion, to select alternatives 
using only the most salient differences, to select data to 
confirm past decisions, and to be influenced by 
irrelevant, perhaps unconscious motives.  
Considering the prevalence of flawed heuristics and 
hidden personal and political agendas, intuitive 
judgments should be treated as important but highly 
suspect recommendations that need to be evaluated. It 
has been “suggested that the troublesome nature of 
automated (tacit) intuitive judgment may be addressed 
by raising the decision process to an explicit level 
through techniques such as devil’s advocacy or 
balancing intuitive judgment with formal analytical 
tools (such as multi-attribute decision analysis and root 
cause analysis).” [13] It is important to recognize the 
strength and prevalence of intuitive decision methods, 
but it is necessary to challenge them with critical 
rational analysis.   
 
7. Intuition can lead to bad decisions 
Depending on “engineering judgment” can lead to 
disaster, as shown by the overconfidence that led to the 
unreliable space shuttle design.  
 
7.1 Space shuttle design 
The problems with shuttle originated with decisions 
made during Apollo. Risk analysis predicted that Apollo 
would suffer many fatalities before we reached the 
moon. This fear and the tragic Apollo 1 fire focused 
everyone on eliminating risk as much as possible. 
Anyone could raise an issue. But then, management 
discontinued risk analysis to avoid damaging public 
support for Apollo. The spectacular success of Apollo 
created over confidence and led to accepting too much 
risk in the space shuttle design.  
Apollo risk was high. The “calculation was made by 
its architecting team, assuming all elements from 
propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as 
well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would 
be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth. Even 
to do that well, launch vehicle failure rates would have 
to be half those ever achieved and with untried 
propulsion systems.” [15]  
The awareness of risk let to intense focus on 
reducing risk. “The only possible explanation for the 
astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – 
was that every participant at every level in every area 
far exceeded the norm of human capabilities. ” [15]  
However, this risk awareness was not considered 
appropriate for the public. The NASA Administrator felt 
that if the results were made public, “the numbers could 
do irreparable harm.” The risk analysis effort was 
cancelled and NASA no longer used numerical risk 
assessment as a result. [16]  
Unfortunately, the amazing success of Apollo led to 
extreme overconfidence. The head of Apollo reliability 
and safety decided, “Statistics don’t count for 
anything,” and that risk is reduced by “attention taken in 
design.” This attitude was carried forward from Apollo 
to shuttle. A NASA safety analysis explained that 
shuttle “relies on engineering judgment using rigid and 
well-documented design, configuration, safety, 
reliability, and quality assurance controls.” It was also 
thought that, with the attention given to safety and 
reliability, “standard failure rate data are pessimistic.” 
[16]  
Accepting too much risk in the design of the shuttle 
produced a system that was too dangerous. Unlike the 
hardened Apollo capsule heat shield, the shuttle crew 
compartment used fragile tiles, unlike the Apollo crew 
module, the shuttle crew compartment was next to 
rather than above the dangerous rockets, and unlike 
Apollo, the shuttle had no crew escape or launch abort 
systems. These design errors directly led to the 
Challenger and Columbia accidents. The current rocket 
and crew vehicle designs are similar to the safer design 
configuration of Apollo, with a hardened crew capsule, 
the crew capsule above the rocket and fuel, and a launch 
abort system.  
The space shuttle was not designed for acceptable 
risk because the overall quantitative risk was not 
considered in its design. The ultimate cause of the 
shuttle tragedies was the choice by the Apollo-era 
NASA administrator to discontinue risk analysis to 
avoid damaging the Apollo program.  
 
7.2 Equivalent System Mass (ESM) 
The establishment of Equivalent System Mass 
(ESM) as the technology selection metric for space life 
support projects illustrates a similar judgment-based 
neglect of technical reality. ESM was established to 
advocate research in advanced life support research and 
to increase its funding. ESM is a measure of the total 
launch mass required to provide space life support, 
including the hardware mass, the logistics mass for parts 
and materials, and the allocated mass of the required 
power and cooling systems. Since recycling life support 
is used to reduce the need to launch large masses of 
water, oxygen, and other materials, making ESM the 
technology selection metric emphasizes the justification 
for recycling. In contrast, the standard NASA systems 
engineering approach uses LCC, which includes 
development, launch, and operations costs, and also 
emphasizes that many other systems considerations, 
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such as performance, safety, risk, and reliability, should 
also be considered in technology selection. [17] [18] 
The great benefit of using recycling instead of material 
resupply was to reduce launch mass, but it is illogical to 
pursue only further mass reductions. Most of the 
original launch mass has already been saved. Recycling 
systems should now be engineered to trade back some 
of the mass savings to improve other system 
requirements, such as performance, safety, risk, and 
reliability. With the recent 20-fold reduction in launch 
costs, reducing launch mass is no longer a major 
consideration in life support design. This is another case  
where management judgment should be rationally 
checked using systems engineering methods, such as a 
checklist.  
 
8. Politics is needed to resolve conflicts 
Politics strongly affects project selection but it 
seems a necessary part of the budget allocation process.  
 
8.1 Politics affects project selection  
The intuitive approach recognizes that many factors 
in project selection are not explicitly known. “Much of 
the information used to evaluate candidate ideas and 
projects will necessarily judgmental in nature. Thus, 
individual differences in perspectives, viewpoints, and 
experiences may influence the appraisal and analysis. 
Organizational politics, departmental goals, and group 
loyalties may further influence the decision criteria and 
procedures.” [6] Greater ambiguity and the need to use 
judgment and intuition encourage the use of power and 
politics. “(T)he more the ambiguity on goals or means 
to accomplish them, the more likely is the exercise of 
political power in decision making.” [19]  
Politics is expected. “R&D project selection 
processes are political in nature.” “The signs of political 
confrontation and conflict emerge quite clearly from the 
analysis. The decision outcome is perceived as 
politically sensitive, and to have been made well in 
advance. The communication between the parties is 
perceived as bad. The decision outcome is strongly 
influenced by the top management, and people expect 
things to be dealt with neither fairly or honestly. It is 
likely to be a conflict process.” [20]  
 
8.2 Politics seems necessary  
With limited resources, People with different goals 
and interests inevitably compete for priority and 
funding. Looked at practically, politics is the necessary 
process used to resolve such goal conflicts. Decisions 
must be made even when facts and logic are not 
sufficient.  
Bolman and Deal define a political framework for 
analyzing organizations:  
1. Organizations are coalitions of diverse interest 
groups and individuals, 
2. They have different goals and beliefs, 
3. The important decisions allocate scarce resources, 
4. Scarce resources and different goals cause conflict, 
5. Goals and decisions emerge from bargaining and 
struggle for resources. [8]  
Conflicts over goals and funding are the cause of 
organizational politics and some process is needed to 
reconcile these conflicts. [21]  
 
9. Fairness is important in project selection 
In general, people expect that serious matters will be 
handled fairly. An organization’s culture determines the 
“rules of the game” and people learn what to expect 
from “the system.” Perceived injustice can reduce team 
members’ commitment and effort.  
Project selection should seem fair. “Procedural 
justice refers to the legitimacy of the methods used to 
make the decision.” “(T)he following six factors 
influence perceptions of procedural justice: (1) 
consistency (the use of consistent procedures), (2) bias 
suppression (the absence of self-interest), (3) accuracy 
(the use of accurate information), (4) correctability (the 
presence of opportunities to correct the decision), (5) 
representativeness (all concerned parties adequately 
represented), and (6) ethicality (adherence to moral and 
ethical standards).” [22]  
The use of reasonably rational and fair methods in 
project selection creates confidence and trust in the 
organization. [22]  
 
10. Discussion  
The logic behind the recommendation to implement 
a formal project selection process such as a checklist is 
as follows:  
1. Organizations, projects, and project selection should 
be rational and are assumed to be rational.  
1.1. But they are not. 
2. The reason is that human insight, intuition, and “gut 
feel,” rather than reason, control decisions.  
2.1. Organizational and project decisions are made 
using unconscious individual and group 
psychology.  
3. Nevertheless, we need to do rational project analysis 
and selection. 
3.1. The rational spirit is necessary for a scientific 
and technical organization.  
3.2. Professional ethics requires an open, honest, 
and fair process. 
3.3. Rational analysis can improve good projects 
and eliminate bad ones.  
3.4. A sanity check helps avoid egregious and 
embarrassing errors. 
 
11. Conclusions  
Many engineering methods have been developed to 
select projects, including quantitative metrics and 
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qualitative success factors. One of the simplest is to use 
a checklist of criteria.  
Project selection methods are little used, partly 
because they have not been proven effective. The main 
reason that formal project selection is not used is that 
managers strongly prefer to rely on their own judgment 
and “gut feel.” Most management decisions use 
simplifying heuristics and reflect group biases. This 
often works well, but in unfamiliar and highly technical 
situations, natural human instincts, intuition, and even 
acquired technical expertise can fail and lead to 
grievous mistakes.  
The approval of a project nearly always requires 
intuitive acceptance and group support, but often omits 
checking economic and technical rationality. It is more 
advisable to systematically doubt intuition and always 
rationally analyze projects before they are approved.  
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